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Emerging Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is the region most affected by spillovers of 
the global financial crisis which originated in the U.S. and quickly spread to Western 
Europe and other world regions. Nevertheless, some countries in CEE appeared to be 
more prepared and resilient than others. While Hungary, Latvia, Serbia, Romania and 
Ukraine were among the first to approach and negotiate financial support programs with 
the IMF, other countries, e.g. Estonia, Lithuania, Montenegro and Armenia, followed and 
showed signs of increasing distress and international assistance. On the other hand, 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia have been 
significantly more resilient to the immediate effects of the global financial crisis. 
Although the latter small open economies did not escape the negative second round 
effects due to large declines in the external demand for their exports. In order to draw 
some lessons from why some countries weathered the initial negative spillovers of the 
global financial crisis better than others, we focus on the case of the Czech economy and 
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characteristics of its financial sector in particular, and subsequently bring in some 
supporting cross-country evidence from the new EU member states.  
 
1. The Czech Republic Case 
Instead of carrying out a cross-country comparison of financial sector indicators we focus 
on institutions, economic policies and ensuing economic behavior in different sectors of 
the economy to understand the drivers behind relatively positive financial sector 
indicators for the Czech Republic. The predispositions of the Czech economy to endure 
the initial effects of the global financial crisis better than some other CEE countries have 
derived from several factors/policies: (i) the applied flexible exchange rate regime, (ii) 
relative fiscal discipline, (iii) success in ensuring macroeconomic stability, (iv) 
consolidated financial supervision, and (v) the experience and lessons from a past 
financial crisis.  
 
(i) Exchange Rate Management 
Although the Czech economy has large export-oriented manufacturing sector with the 
share of industrial production on GDP of about 30 percent – the largest in the EU – the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) firmly embraced the idea of not artificially manipulating the 
exchange rate to the advantage of the export industry despite its strong lobby. The CNB 
repeatedly emphasized that a small economy and its businesses and labor unions should 
learn to deal with external shocks and this approach contributed to increasing flexibility 
of the Czech economy. In addition, the sustained appreciation of the exchange rate due to 
favorable productivity growth differential vis-à-vis the Eurozone helped contain overly 
optimistic expectations in the corporate sector and excessive credit boom in this sector.  
  
(ii) Fiscal Policy 
There has been also strong consensus on the need to increase fiscal discipline that has 
been realized in the years preceding the global financial crisis. Hence, the flexible 
exchange rate regime and fiscal prudence have been the main factors in helping sustain 
external balance – trade surplus and modest current account deficit. 
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(iii) Central Bank Independence 
The high independence
1
 and gained credibility
2
 of the CNB contributed to successful 
macroeconomic stabilization in the years preceding the global financial crisis. This 
together with increased fiscal discipline and sound balance-of-payments accounts was the 
main drivers behind the fact that since early 2005 there has been a negative interest rate 
differential between the CZK and EUR interest rates (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The CZK-EUR Interest Rate Differential 2001-2009 
 
Source: DataStream 
 
Although one would expect that low interest rates result in undesirable credit boom this 
circumstance had some shielding effects on the Czech economy. Namely, the CZK, as a 
relatively low yielding currency, is not so attractive for speculators, and unlike in some 
other countries Czech households do not have the incentive to borrow in foreign currency 
and expose their balance sheets to foreign exchange risk. The government itself has not 
borrowed extensively in foreign currency and this raises an interesting question 
concerning the effect of public-debt currency allocation on the private sector-debt 
currency allocation. Nevertheless, mortgage lending grew substantially with financial 
                                                 
1
 The CNB independence was established in 1993, anchored in the Constitution and tested by 
Constitutional Court. 
2
 Mainly thanks to conservative monetary policy within the inflation targeting framework (as of 1998).   
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penetration in this segment reaching significantly higher levels than in other EU10 
countries, except for Slovakia, comparable to Belgium, Denmark or Luxemburg. This has 
resulted in housing bubbles especially in large cities like Prague. This could be seen as a 
troubling element waiting in the pipe-line when credit portfolio quality deteriorates as a 
result of the decline in aggregate income. Only relatively conservative lending practices 
in the past, involving a more conservative average loan-to-value ratio and debt service-to-
income ratio, are somewhat comforting.   
 
(iv) Macro-Financial Stability 
The Czech financial system has been characterized by excess liquidity, supported by low 
CZK interest rates, and CNB has been traditionally withdrawing liquidity from the 
market in the tune of CZK350 bln daily. The high credibility of domestic currency (CZK) 
-- thanks to prudent monetary policy -- high financial penetration
3
 and relatively less 
impatient households helped establish a solid and relatively diversified deposit base 
which was able to fully finance the most recent credit boom, on aggregate. Namely, the 
loan to deposit ratio stood at 78 percent by mid-2008, by far the lowest among EU10 
countries (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Loan-to-Deposit Ratios of Selected ECA countries 
 
Source: IFS, EBRD 
                                                 
3
 About 80 percent of adult population has a bank account, similarly as in Slovakia and Croatia while in 
Slovenia this ratio reaches 97 percent. 
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While the exposure of the banking system to toxic assets was negligible (less than 1 
percent) the system has been showing relatively high profitability as compared to other 
EU10 countries. Specifically, by April 2008 the ROE stood at about 23 percent the third 
highest after Poland and Bulgaria (both with about 25 percent ROE). This certainly 
helped sustain the little external funding from mother banks that the Czech banking 
system, largely foreign owned, was tapping into. Preliminary anecdotal evidence, based 
on the comparison of the relative speed with which external funding has been withdrawn 
from Kazakhstan and Hungary, could suggest that a higher degree of committed foreign 
ownership in a domestic banking sector, through incorporated foreign subsidiaries, can 
decrease reversibility of external financing. 
 
(v) Consolidated Supervision 
In addition, the institutional arrangement concerning financial regulation and supervision 
and its links to monetary policy proved to be important for the Czech Republic in coping 
with the onset of the global financial crisis. In 2005, the Czech Republic integrated its 
financial supervision and undertook a related functional reorganization so that as of 2006 
consolidated supervision of all segments
4
 of the financial system was in place. The 
experience has shown that financial groups very much appreciate having to deal with just 
one financial supervisor, especially in periods of financial turmoil. The capacity for rapid 
supervisory response has been boosted by increased monitoring efforts and collection of 
daily information
5
, and 1-2 week frequency of communication between the CNB 
Governor (Vice-Governor) and the bank association. The ability of rapid supervisory 
action has been tested in practice in the context of the Societe General scandal. The 
independence of bank subsidiaries has also played a role in protecting their financial 
standing when problems within the financial groups arose – e.g. Komercni Banka 
                                                 
4
 Nevertheless, there are still some financial sector institutions which the CNB does not supervise, such as 
e.g. leasing companies or non-bank credit institutions. These institutions could be used for regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage. 
5
 The decision to collect daily data was implemented on the next day, and the collected data comprise cash 
requirements, money market and government bond market, financial institutions (banks and other 
important financial players), liquidity stance, exposures within group, deposits levels, fulfillment of 
regulatory limits and withdrawal from money market funds.   
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(Societe General) or AIG Czech Republic. In addition, existence of own national 
currency makes funds withdrawal from subsidiaries to parents more complicated. 
Furthermore, as of February 2008 the mandate of the CNB was augmented to include 
consumer protection in financial services which effectively increased the powers of the 
supervisor in the area of business conduct enforcement. This further enhances financial 
prudential supervision by enabling the CNB to curb the accumulation of indirect credit 
risk in the households sector.  
 
(vi) Experience of a Past Crisis 
Apart from all the negative effects of financial crises, the experience of a past financial 
crisis, like that in the Czech Republic during 1997-1998, makes countries usually more 
agile in undertaking crisis-mitigation reforms in the financial sector. Namely, the 
experience tends to (a) improve the coordination between key financial sector 
government agencies, i.e. the MoF and the CB, (b) equip countries with tested bank 
resolution and financial rehabilitation frameworks, and (c) make government aware of the 
need to prioritize in their classification of systemically important banks with respect to 
the limited available fiscal space, (d) make countries adopt measures to support efficient 
dealing with bad loans and out-of-court loan restructuring. Nevertheless, repeated 
financial crises tend to further undermine the credibility of the financial sector, divert the 
financial sector reform agenda from a holistic to a piece-meal approach, and induce 
strong and sustained negative social impacts.  
 
2. Supplementary, Cross-Country Data Analysis 
In this section, we make some preliminary cross-country comparisons in order to put the 
discussion in Section 1 into a quantitative perspective. We compare the selected aspects 
of the Czech Republic’s economy to other countries with similar institutional 
backgrounds, levels of income convergence and the degree of integration to the EU. 
Namely, we consider the following group of countries as reasonable comparators: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia (the EU11 henceforth).  
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We structure the cross-country data analysis around the outcome variables that have 
made the Czech Republic more resilient to the first round of negative effects from the 
global financial crisis. Following this structure, we then associate the outcomes with their 
possible drivers, without claiming causality. In a nutshell, there have been three main 
outcomes that have enabled the Czech economy to withstand the first wave of capital 
flow reversals from emerging markets.  
 
These three outcomes, i.e. the initial conditions before the global financial crisis, have 
been (i) a relatively low interest rate differential vis-à-vis developed countries, the 
Eurozone in particular; (ii) a relatively low loan-to-deposit ratio, and (iii) a relatively low 
share of foreign exchange loans in total bank loans. The relatively low interest rate 
differential and loan-to-deposit ratio have helped in discouraging large short-term capital 
inflows and thus have diminished the leverage effect of potential capital flow reversal. 
The relatively low foreign currency denomination of the domestic deposit base and credit 
(both public and private) permits the Czech economy to take advantage of CZK 
depreciation and ensure that even at higher levels of the depreciation the positive income 
effect – through increased price competitiveness of net exports – dominates the negative 
balance sheet (valuation) effect stemming from the FX denominated credit. Some 
empirical support for the three outcomes is presented next.    
 
Figure 3: Central Bank Credibility and Internal and External Balances 
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Note: the Central Bank credibility index constructed as a sum of CB independence and transparency indexes.  
Source: Crowe & Meade (2008), IMF and staff calculations 
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The data for the EU11 suggests that an independent and transparent central bank 
facilitates better macroeconomic management and lower risk premium on the national 
currency. The evidence presented in Figure 3 supports this premise as central bank 
credibility appears to be significantly
6
 correlated with lower overheating in the EU11 
countries (left panel). The degree of overheating, traditionally measured by the size of an 
output gap, is here approximated directly by the maximum annual inflation rate 
experienced by the EU11 countries over 2004-2008.
7
 Higher central bank credibility 
appears to be also associated with lower external imbalances, as approximated by the 
current account-to-GDP ratio (the right panel), and hence lower currency risk premium.     
 
Flexible exchange rate regimes appear to significantly reduce accumulation of large 
external imbalances and thus the currency risk premium. Figure 4 (left panel) shows that 
the relationship between the external imbalance (current account-to-GDP ratio) by 2008 
and the flexibility of an exchange rate regime appears to be significant for the EU11 
countries. Hence, obstructing the most flexible price of any small open economy, i.e. the 
exchange rate, can make the economy much less flexible and competitive vis-à-vis 
changing external environment unless the lost exchange rate flexibility is substituted by 
relatively higher product and labor markets’ flexibility. In addition, it appears that more 
transparent central banks tend to apply more flexible exchange rate regimes (Figure 4, 
right panel), which points to the importance of promoting transparency and accountability 
of public institutions in order to foster an economy’s flexibility and competitiveness.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In fact, when the Slovak Republic, with extremely low central bank credibility is eliminated from the 
sample the correlation becomes much more significant with R2 of close to 0.40. The same holds for the 
correlation between the central bank credibility and the current account-to-GDP ratio.   
7
 Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that this measure mixes demand side and supply side shocks. The 
increases in food and commodity prices have thus biased this measure but we assume it has a broadly 
uniform effect on the EU11 economies. 
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Figure 4: Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes, External Imbalances and Central Bank 
Transparency 
 
Source: Crowe & Meade (2008), IMF, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
 
 
Credible monetary policy under flexible exchange regimes seemed to have worked for 
the EU11 countries well in terms of building trust in their national currencies and 
achieving greater interest rate convergence with the Eurozone. Figure 5 (left panel) 
shows that the EU11 countries with more credible monetary policy tend to be more 
successful in achieving higher interest rate converge with the euro as the risk premium on 
their respective national currencies is diminished. In fact, if the Slovak Republic is taken 
out for its unusually low score on central bank credibility the correlation between central 
bank credibility and interest rate convergence to the euro increases to about 0.35.
8
  This 
would suggest that adopting credible macroeconomic policies could be a better strategy 
for a country, than fixing or converting the national currency to the euro, to shield itself 
better from negative spillovers from a financial crisis. Further, governments get to learn 
                                                 
8
 This is because e.g. Cukierman’s index shows Slovakia as significantly more independent compared to 
Crowe & Meade’s index. There are some inconsistencies across different Central Bank independence 
Indexes. I have opted for Crowe & Meade’s (2008) Central Bank Independence index which appears to be 
the most up-to-date as opposed to e.g. Cukierman ‘s CBI index which runs only till 2000. Both indexes 
show some striking differences and similarities across countries, however, the CEE countries have 
undertaken significant reforms since 2000 in the area of central bank independence so that the index of 
Crowe & Meade seems to be more appropriate.  
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over time about the counterproductive effects of politically-influenced over-expansionary 
fiscal policy in a presence of an independent and transparent central banker. And, as the 
data suggest, the increased fiscal discipline will also help diminish the risk premium on 
the national currency and promote interest rate convergence to the euro (Figure 5, right 
panel).  
 
Figure 5: Credible Monetary Policy, Fiscal Discipline and Interest Rate 
Convergence  
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Source: Crowe & Meade (2008), IMF 
 
This raises a question of whether implementation of a fiscal policy rule could substitute 
for greater independence and transparency of the central bank, especially, in an 
institutional environment in which political economy aspects constrain the move to 
greater independence and transparency of the national central bank.    
 
The data evidence presented in Figure 6 implies that the institutional and applied 
macroeconomic policies, which contributed to relatively greater interest rate convergence 
of countries like the Czech Republic to the Eurozone, also contributed to lower credit 
dollarization. Credit dollarization is here expressed as the percentage of foreign exchange 
(FX) denominated loans in total loans (Figure 6, left panel). One of the applied policies 
that contributed to better macroeconomic stabilization, lower currency risk premium and 
thus interest rate convergence has been the adoption of flexible exchange rate regimes. 
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Figure 6(left panel) shows that there has been a significant association between higher 
exchange rate flexibility and lower credit dollarization in the EU11 economies. This 
lower credit dollarization has enabled countries to respond to lowering external demand 
with corresponding depreciation of their currencies, thus increasing the price 
competitiveness of their products and services and balancing their external accounts. 
However, this positive income effect of depreciating domestic currency is dominated by a 
negative valuation effect in countries with highly dollarized credit because the debt-
service charges on FX denominated debt increase non-linearly when the domestic 
currency devaluates.  
 
Figure 6: Interest Rate Convergence, Flexible Exchange Rates and Credit 
Euroization  
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Source: IMF, Raiffeisen, Bloomberg, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)  
 
The credit dollarization exacerbates the situation further by impairing the ability of the 
non-bank private sector with unhedged FX exposures to service their debt and leads, in 
conjunction with the depreciating domestic currency, to realization of indirect credit risk 
due to preexisting FX exposures. This, in turn, leads to deterioration of banks’ loan 
portfolio and, in times when the debt-servicing ability of households and firms is also 
squeezed from other side due to lower income, a severe credit crunch is inevitable. The 
large FX exposures are especially dangerous as banking regulation often does not require 
banks to provision for the corresponding expected losses which are thus being backed up 
directly by banks capital. This is one of the justifications for the emerging market 
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economies with higher credit dollarization to have higher capital requirements, even for 
subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
 
However, there could be even more fundamental reasons for the increased credit 
dollarization, accumulation of indirect credit risk, ensuing credit crunch and potential 
bank failures. The fundamentally higher impatience of households
9
, who faced credit 
rationing during the 1990s in some countries, could be one of those. Figure 7 (left panel) 
shows a significant positive correlation between the average private consumption growth 
over 2001-2007 – roughly the length of the last credit boom – and the loan-to-deposit 
ratios in the EU11 countries. The 0.6 correlation coefficient suggests that countries with 
relatively impatient households ended up leveraging themselves more by borrowing from 
abroad and consuming beyond their means.  
 
Figure 7: Households Impatience, Banking Sector Leverage and Indirect Credit 
Risk 
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Sources: IFS, EBRD, Raiffeisen, Bloomberg 
 
                                                 
9
 Note that the relatively lower saving rate as a result of higher average consumption growth would be also 
a main factor behind the formation of unsustainable current account deficits, althout some other factors 
such as relatively higher government dissavings, more rigid exchange rate regimes or higher remittances, 
could play a role as well. 
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An important driver on the supply-side was also the allocation policies of the banks 
which favored high loan-to-deposit ratios in countries with high interest rate spreads and 
thus fueled rapid credit growth and dollarization (euroization) of the provided credit. As 
economies increase their leverage by utilizing foreign credit lines the competition in 
lending for higher credit-market shares becomes more intense. This usually results in 
lowering interest rates on domestic currency loans. Next, banks focus on FX denominated 
loans also to unhedged borrowers to cut the costs (not hedging or converting the FX 
funding into local currency), they do not provision for the laid off indirect credit risk, and 
on top, use the FX currencies with the highest negative interest rate spread, e.g. the Swiss 
franc in Hungary. Then or in parallel with the switch to FX lending, banks start to lower 
the credit standards till the credit cycle tilts. Increased proximity of financial supervision 
and monetary policy is thus needed to ensure better macro-prudential supervision, such as 
the consistency of the economy’s saving rate with its credit growth. The process of 
switching to FX lending under higher leverage in order to gain some advantage in 
competing for the market share is illustrated in Figure 7 (right panel). It shows a 
significant association between the loan-to-deposit ratios and credit dollarization in the 
EU11 countries.        
 
These preliminary findings raise a couple of questions. First, did the impatience come 
from the desire of e.g. the Baltics to get to the living standard enjoyed by the Nordics? 
Or, is it because the emphasis on and political agenda behind income convergence went 
astray from sustainable income convergence? Maybe, it is a lesson to go to the basics not 
only in terms of financial innovation and introduction of financial products, but also in 
assessing what are the sustainable (potential) growth rates for emerging market 
economies -- especially in their transformation from upper-middle income economies to 
high income economies. The catch-up effect from improved institutions and imitation in 
innovation is finite and should not be overstated, while indicators of overheating should 
be closely monitored and responded to with adequate policy measures. Second, has it 
been excessive financial penetration or banks’ competition in lending that have made 
several financial sectors in the EU11 stretched beyond their capacities? Or, has it been 
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inadequate regulation and its enforcement and the negligence of important macro-
financial linkages. One could argue that most probably both. 
 
At the same time, several countries of the EU11 saw the benefits from consolidated 
financial supervision and its proximity to monetary policy. The second round of the 
negatives spillovers of the global financial crisis became more pronounced, though, and 
the declining external demand from developed economies brought many small, open, 
emerging economies to recession. This then leads to another set of questions may arise 
concerning the tradeoff between specialization (product and geographical) for foreign 
trade and export diversification and import substitution.    
 
4. Conclusion 
The experience of the 1997-1998 financial crisis and the onset of the current global 
financial crisis has offered some lessons in the case of the Czech Republic. Namely, that 
it is effective to establish a consolidated supervisor at the national level, ideally within a 
strong and independent central bank. That, consolidation of financial regulation and 
supervision facilitates a fast-action response, comprehensive data collection and analysis, 
and generates higher respect for the supervisor in the financial community. These lessons 
are especially important in the context of possible future centralization of financial 
supervision at the European level, since the potential European supervisor should avoid 
coordinating several institutions at the level of individual countries. In addition, the 
lessons further stress the important role of macro-prudential supervision focusing, among 
others, on ensuring moderate loan-to-deposit ratios of the banking sector and low 
dollarization of loans through adequate pricing of foreign exchange risk by the banks. A 
prudent macroeconomic management also appears to deliver the benefits of low interest 
rate differentials and thus a lower share of reversible capital. Finally, more sustainable 
foreign financing appears to be enjoyed by banking sectors with higher shares of foreign 
banks’ subsidiaries in total banking sector assets.   
          
So what could have been the policy response to the creeping-in effects of the global 
financial crisis in the case of the Czech Republic? Due to low credit euroization, the 
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macroeconomic policy response to the negative spillover effects in the form of low 
external demand could involve further CZK depreciation. While the increased external 
price competitiveness could provide some support to aggregate income through increased 
exports, it is important that the banking system can support lending to SMEs. This is 
because SMEs will attempt to substitute out less price-competitive imports and fill in 
opening supply-side niches. 
 
 
 
          
